In summary, DOE must prioritize the buried waste for exhumation and treatment, and then process the stored waste. Since the TRU was co-mingled with low-level waste dumped in the pits and trenches, all the buried waste must be exhumed and characterized. DOE's own internal reports acknowledge that the administrative limits of up to 400 grams of U-235 or 237 grams of Pu-239 that could be disposed in the same container were exceeded regularly. [29] The implications of this disposal practice is that the AMWTP plans on using super compaction of the existing waste drums which could cause a criticality or self sustained fissioning of the nuclear material. The Defense Nuclear Safety Board identified serious violations at INEEL including "problems of Greater than Class C low-level waste dumped at RWMC and other wastes unsuited for shallow burial are unresolved.[30] This includes the reactor fuel rod parts dumped in the "soil vaults" and the intermediate level waste dumped in the concrete silos. The RWMC as a whole simply should not be used as a dump site because of the flood hazard, and the fact that it sits above a sole source aquifer. Surface water accelerates the contaminate leaching process. The groundwater contamination leaves no doubt that the waste is migrating and any assumption of soil attenuation was wrong. The vitrification component must be reinstated because only this treatment will meet yet to be determined repository waste acceptance criteria. Vitrification will also provide a safety margin for the inevitable on-site long-term storage because of DOE's inability to construct safe permanent waste repositories.

[29] A History of the Radioactive Waste Management Complex at INEL [sic], EG&G Idaho, September 1979, page 30

[30] DNFSB-TRU-08049, page 3